Logic, language and the liar paradox

Bibliographic Details
Erscheint auch als: Pleitz, Martin, 1972 - , Logic, language, and the liar paradox, Münster : mentis, 2018, 1 Online-Ressource, 9783957438492
Other Editions: Logic, language, and the structure of scientific theories proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21 - 24 May 1991
Authors and Corporations: Pleitz, Martin (Author), mentis Verlag GmbH (Publisher)
Title: Logic, language and the liar paradox Martin Pleitz
Dissertation Note:Dissertation, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 2012
Münster mentis Verlag [2018]
Physical Description:651 Seiten; 24 cm
ISSN/ISBN: 3957430348
Summary:The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist – and examples like “This sentence is not true” certainly suggest this –, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.
Type of Resource:Book Thesis Hochschulschrift
Source:Verbunddaten SWB
Notes:Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 631-651
Language: English