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“BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG”
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Titel: |
“BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG” |
In: | Social Philosophy and Policy, 27, 2010, 2, S. 135-157 |
veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
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Umfang: | 135-157 |
ISSN: |
0265-0525 1471-6437 |
DOI: | 10.1017/s0265052509990185 |
Zusammenfassung: | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest “buck-passing” about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but “passes the buck” to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of normative concepts entail buck-passing with respect to reasons for the specific attitudes that are inherently involved in the concept, the concepts of moral obligation and wrong are normative not in the first instance for action, but for a distinctive set of attitudes (Strawsonian “reactive attitudes”) through which we hold ourselves and one another answerable for our actions. On this analysis, moral obligations are demands we legitimately make as representative persons, and the fact that an act would violate such a demand, and so disrespect the authority these demands presuppose, is indeed a reason not to perform the wrongful act that is additional to whatever features make the act wrong.</jats:p> |
Format: | E-Article |
Quelle: | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (CrossRef) |
Sprache: | Englisch |