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SUBJECTIVE FAULT FOR CRIME: A Reinterpretation
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Titel: |
SUBJECTIVE FAULT FOR CRIME: A Reinterpretation |
In: | Legal Theory, 14, 2008, 1, S. 1-38 |
veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
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Umfang: | 1-38 |
ISSN: |
1352-3252 1469-8048 |
DOI: | 10.1017/s1352325208080014 |
Zusammenfassung: | <jats:p>This essay develops a liberal account of the mens rea requirement of criminal liability and identifies the fault level required by that account. By “a liberal account” is meant one that interprets the meaning of mens rea in a way that reconciles liability to coercion with the individual's inviolability. The article argues that the wrongdoer's choice to interfere or to risk interfering with another agent's capacity to act on his own ends is the level of fault required to make punishment implicitly self-imposed by the recipient and thus distinguishable from the wrongdoer's violence. Such a choice is one to which a denial of rights of agency may be logically imputed, a denial by which the wrongdoer implicitly authorizes his own coercibility. This version of subjectivism is, I argue, invulnerable against criticisms leveled against other versions. While staking out defensible subjectivist ground, the article criticizes the character, choice, and opportunity theories of mens rea proposed by Fletcher, Moore, and Hart, and elaborates the interpretations of exculpatory conditions flowing from the subjectivist thesis. Finally, it addresses arguments advanced by Ripstein, Duff, and Horder for eliminating the requirement of a conscious choice to do that which amounts to a denial of rights.</jats:p> |
Format: | E-Article |
Quelle: | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (CrossRef) |
Sprache: | Englisch |